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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ANDREW FARROW, 
Plaint iff-Appellant, 
: Case No. 
-vs- 14011 
SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, : 
D e f e n d a n t - R e s p o n d e n t . : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE. 
The a p p e l l a n t , Andrew F a r r o w , a p p e a l s f rom an o r d e r 
e n t e r e d i n t h e T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t , S a l t L a k e C o u n t y , 
S t a t e o f U t a h , d i s m i s s i n g w i t h p r e j u d i c e p e t i t i o n e r ' s p e t i t i o n 
f o r a w r i t o f h a b e a s c o r p u s . 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On J a n u a r y 3 0 , 1 9 7 5 , a h e a r i n g w a s h e l d on a p e t i t i o n 
f o r a w r i t o f h a b e a s c o r p u s a l l e g i n g t h a t A n d r e w F a r r o w ' s g u i l t y 
p l e a t o t h e c r i m e o f m a n s l a u g h t e r was n o t i n c l u d e d w i t h i n t h e 
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charge of second degree murder, and since no information was 
filed nor preliminary hearing accorded or waived on the man-
slaughter offense, the court lacked jurisdiction to proceed on 
the charge of manslaughter. The Court dismissed the petition 
with prejudice on February 6, 1975. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the order of the district court judge dismissing the petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent acknowledges that the petitioner was charged 
with the crime of Criminal Homicide in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1973), criminal number 25767. Thereafter, 
in an amended information, petitioner was charged with Criminal 
Homicide Second Degree Murder. Petitioner later pled guilty to 
the crime of manslaughter and maintains that the crime of 
Criminal Homicide Manslaughter, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (Supp. 
1973), is not a lesser included offense within the crime of 
Criminal Homicide Second Degree Murder, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 
(Supp. 1973) (Tr.26-27) . Based on this assumption, petitioner 
- -2- '. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
asserts that the filing of a separate information was necessary, 
charging him with Criminal Homicide Manslaughter. No information 
having been filed, petitioner maintains that the lower court 




MANSLAUGHTER IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF SECOND 
DEGREE MURDER. 
The petitioner's argument hinges on whether manslaughter 
is a lesser included offense of second degree murder. If it is, 
the filing of a new information charging manslaughter was unneces-
sary, and the court had jurisdiction based on the original amended 
information. Respondent submits that Criminal Homicide Manslaughter 
is a lesser included offense of Criminal Homicide Second Degree 
Murder and therefore the filing of a new information was unnecessary 
in order to vest the trial court with jurisdiction to receive and 
pass sentence on the guilty plea. 
A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in 
the offense charged, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)(a) (Supp. 
1973), when: 
_3_ 
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" (a) It is established by 
proof of the same or less than all 
the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged 
n 
• • • • 
The statute codifies the so-called "same evidence" test as 
defined under previous case law. See State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 
2d 195, 371 P.2d 27 (1962) ; Williams v. Turner, 421 F.2d 168, • 
169 (10th Cir. 1971); and State v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 33 P.2d 
640, 645 (1934). In State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d "195, 197, 371 
P.2d 27, 29 (1962), Justice Crockett elaborated on the definition 
of a lesser included offense and stated: 
"The rule as to when one offense 
is included in another is that the greater 
offense includes a lesser one when establish-
ment of the greater would necessarily include 
proof of all of the elements necessary to 
prove the lesser. Conversely, it is only 
when the proof of the lesser offense requires 
some element not involved in the greater 
offense that the lesser would not be an 
included offense." 
Thus, in accordance with both the statutory and judicial defini-
tions of a lesser included offense, it is necessary to look to 
the legal elements of second degree murder and manslaughter and 
compare them to see whether the elements of manslaughter are 
embraced within the elements of second degree murder. 
-4-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Manslaughter is clearly an included offense of second 
degree murder. Both offenses require the death of the victim • 
caused by the action of the charged party. Both offenses may 
be proved upon a showing of reckless acts which result in death. 
Manslaughter merely lacks the additional intent element which 
is found in second degree murder, and requires only that the • 
party charged causedthe death of another under the influence 
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, or tha't the party 
charged caused the death of another, believing himself justified 
either morally or legally in doing so. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-
203(1) (a) (b) and (c) (Supp. 1973) . Manslaughter requires a 
lesser showing of intent, which is a lesser factual showing, 
not a showing of absence of intent, and therefore manslaughter 
complies with the definition of a lesser included offense. 
In Jennings v. State/ 404 P.2d 652 (Alaska 1965), where 
the appellant, charged with second degree murder, was convicted of 
involuntary manslaughter, the court held that the crime of 
involuntary manslaughter, although not requiring malice and a 
specific intent, was necessarily included in the offense of second 
degree murder charged in the indictment. The court reasoned that 
- 5 - •••' 
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an offense is necessarily included in the offense charged 
where the former is of less magnitude than the latter but the 
gravamen of the two offenses is the same, or where one could 
not have committed the offense charged without also having 
committed the offense of lesser magnitude. Thus,* the court 
continued, the difference in the intent required for the two . 
crimes related only to the state of mind of the accused and 
bore upon the degree of punishment, but the gravamen of the 
two offenses, an unlawful killing, was the same. Also, in 
Clown Horse v. State, 170 Neb. 336, 102 N.W.2d 625 (1960), 
where the defendant was charged with murder in the second degree, 
but convicted of manslaughter, the court held that if an informa-
tion charged the crime of murder in the second degree, the crime 
of manslaughter was included in the charge. The court stated 
that the unlawful killing was the principal fact but the condi-
tion of the mind or the attendant circumstances determined the 
class or grade of the crime as second degree murder or man-
slaughter. Both of these cases demonstrate that intent is 
required for manslaughter as well as second degree murder, 
establishment of second degree murder necessarily includes 
-6-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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proof of all of the elements necessary to prove manslaughter, 
and all elements of manslaughter are found in second degree 
murder . ' . ' • • 
The courts, both state and federal, have long recognized 
that manslaughter is an included offense of secon-d degree murder. 
1 See Crokett v. Haskins, 2 Ohio St. 2d 322, 208 N.E.2d 744 
(1965); Davis v. State, 524 P.2d 46 (Okl. Crim. App. 1974); 
Jennings v. State, 404 P.2d 652 (Alaska 1965) ; -People v. 
Heffington, 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 107 Cal.Rptr. 859 (1973) ; 
People ex rel. Fox v. Twomey, 15 111.App.3d 760, 305 N.E.2d 
375 (1973); Dickens v. State, Ind. , 295 N.E.2d 613 
(1973); Duke v. Thomas, 371 S.W.2d 639 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963); 
Commonwealth v. Burke, 342 Mass. 144, 172 N.E.2d 605.(1961); 
Nichols v. Vitek, N.H. , 321 A.2d 570 (1974); Clown 
Horse v. State, 170 Neb. 336, 102 N.W.2d 625 (1960); State v. 
LaBoon, 67 N.M. 466, 357 P.2d 54 (1960); State v. Young, 
18 N.C. App. 576, 197 S.E.2d 237 (1973); State v. Blocher, 
10 Or.App. 357, 499 P.2d 1346 (1972) ; Commonwealth v. Boone, 
450 Pa. 357, 301 A.2d 699 (1973) ; Hewitt v. Commonwealth, 
213 Va. 605, 194 S.E.2d 893 (1973) ; Pendergrast v. United 
States, 332 A.2d 919 (D.C.C.A. 1975) ; Stevenson v. United 
States, 162 U.S. 313, 16 S.Ct. 839, 40 L.Ed. 980 (1896) ; 
Belton v. United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 201, 382 F.2d 
150 (1967); United States v. Comer, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 214, 
421 F.2d 1149 (1970) ; United States v. Celestine, 510 F.2d 
457 (9th Cir. 1975); DeMarrias v. United States, 487 F.2d 
19 (8th Cir. 1973), cert, denied 415 U.S. 980, 94 S.Ct. 
1570, 39 L.Ed.2d 877 (1974). 
-7-
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Courts traditionally submit a series of possible verdicts to 
juries in homicide cases ranging from manslaughter to first 
degree murder and have never required a fresh information and 
second trial on the lesser offense. 
The Utah Supreme Court has implicitly ruled that 
manslaughter is a lesser included offense in State v. Gillian, 
23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P.2d 811 (1970). In that case, Gillian was 
convicted of murder in the first degree and on appeal contended 
that the trial court erred in refusing her requests to instruct 
the jury on the lesser included offenses of second degree murder 
and voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. The Supreme Court 
reversed and held "that the instructions on the lesser offenses 
should have been given." 463 P.2d at 814. During the course of 
the opinion the Court stated: 
"If the jury accepted her version 
of the occurrance, that it was in such a 
state of emotional upset that she got the 
pistol and fired it into the room several 
times, intending only to scare Miller, her 
offense could be found to be involuntary 
manslaughter . . . or up a different view 
of the facts could be found to be voluntary 
manslaughter. . . . " (Emphasis added.) 
463 P.2d at 814. 
-8-
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Finally, there are two practical reasons why the 
petitioner's contention in the present case has no merit. 
First, courts should not allow an inmate who received the 
benefit of plea bargaining down to a lesser included offense 
of manslaughter to subsequently back out of the d'eal. The 
petitioner in the present case clearly agreed to plead 
guilty to the offense of manslaughter in order to escape 
prosecution for second degree murder. Now, however, petit ioner 
challenges this same plea,after the judgment has been rendered 
and which could have been challenged at the time of the agree-
ment, and contends that his guilty plea is invalid. Second, 
in conjunction with the first reason, the petitioner in the 
present case actually benefitted by the inclusion of manslaughter 
within the offense of second degree murder. In almost all of 
the above cases where the appellants and petitioners argued that 
manslaughter was not a lesser included offense of second degree 
murder, the arguments were based on the fact that the accused 
had been convicted of an offense with a more severe penalty than 
the lesser included offense. In the present case, however, the 
-9-
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petitioner clearly benefitted by the bargain, since the offense 
to which he pled guilty was less severe than second degree 
murder. Petitioner has clearly not been injured by the inclusion 
of manslaughter within second degree murder. 
Thus, in conclusion, because manslaughter requires 
proof of all of the elements of second degree murder, in 
accordance with both Utah precedent and precedent from, the 
clear majority of other jurisdictions, and the petitioner should 
not be allowed to complain of a bargain in which he was the 
party benefitted, manslaughter should be held to be a lesser 
included offense within the crime of second degree murder. 
POINT II 
THE PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO TIMELY OBJECT TO THE 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE INFORMATION PRIOR TO ENTERING HIS PLEA 
WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO LATER CHALLENGE THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
INFORMATION. 
A fundamental p r inc ip le of law in t h i s s t a t e i s tha t 
a l l defenses or object ions to an indictment or information must 
be ra ised before an accused enters his p lea ; and absent such 
object ions, a gu i l ty plea i s an admission of whatever i s 
- 1 0 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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charged i.. I ho information i nc 1 n d in g 1.110 i 11 c r ini i 1 i a L j. i u \ facts 
alleged therein, and i s a confession of gn i j 1 ths \ .-wnounts to 
a conviction* The i'o i h •- * - . i< > •• • s >,_ . -de o f 
C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e s u b s t a n t i a lie t h i s p r i n c i p l e : 
] U t a l i C o d e 1 A ' • \ i ' 'V| • 
"No defect :)L ;rroguLsri(\ •... or 
want or absence of ss\, proceeding or 
statutory requirement, prior to t_ ho 
filing of an information or indictment, 
including the preliminary hearing, shall 
constitute pro-judicial error and the 
defendant shall be conclusively presumed 
to have waived any such defect, irregul arity, 
. want or absence of proceeding or statutory 
requirement, unless he shall before pleading 
to the information or indictment specifically 
and expressly object to the information or 
indictment on such ground. " (Empha sis 
added.) 
: 2. Utah Code A m . § 77-/";-; .' (L9s3): 
" I L Liic defendant does not move t o 
quash the information or indictment before 
or ..I: the tin,- he pleads there to he sh.ill 
be taken to have waived a l l objections which 
are grounds for a motion lo quash except those 
which are also a rounds fro»- H notion is a r r s d 
o f "judgmen L .. ' 
ri ' -o *•( I i - . r\ -•
 t l , (i lo timely contest any i r r egu la r i ty \\ 
tne i n r'oi.-'pai ion and instead chose to p.ie^vj .ji;.t i 
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S t a t e v . Stewart: , J LJ uLjh 1:1)3/ 1 7 i P a c . 3b 3 (1^4l ; 
Court .M.1.U th . r i r e p e t i t i o n e r ' s qv. i l l y p lea vvas a M q a , 
endorsemen t o f m e con Lent c f : ':i - -, - ^ \ ' *• *'• ; • I_ • •  > •. 
" U n l e s s t i m e l y wil hdrav/r , -, p l e a 
of g u i l t y p l a c e s a de fendan t i r Uie r-; me 
p o s i t i o n a s a v e r d i c t of a jury f i n d i n g 
him g u i l t y o f t h e c h a r g e a f t e r a f a i r and . 
i m p a r t i a 1 t r i a 1 . A p l e a of g u i l t y i s a ' ' ,. 
c o n f e s s i o n of t h e c o r r e c t n e s s of t h e 
a c c u s a t i o n which d i s p e n s e s w i t h t h e 
n e c e s s i t y o f p r o o f t h e r e o f . " (Emphasis 
a d d e d . ) I d . a t 207, 3 8 5 . 
Ji '.he more r e c e n t c a s e of Combs v . Turner, 23 Utah 2d 3'J 7, 
483 P . 2 u 437 ( I W i / , Liie C"i. "1 liii/lln'i -Me tared MM I a p M n 
of g u i l t y n o t on]y d i s p e n s e d w i t h the n e c e s s i t y of p r o o f , bu t 
p r e v m ; . f .. • <' > r '. M I - , ." i !< M ng suet i i s s u e s i n a 
habeas c o r p u s p r o c e e d i n g : 
\ . p lea o t g u i l t y d i s p e n s e s w: th Ihe 
n e c e s s i t y or" p r ^ o t , .rid t h e i s s u e of 
i n n o c e n c e o r gui . l t cannot h e r e be r e i n i g a t e d 
any more t i , ; . .t c o n i c o^ . H c i . a j u r y v e r d i c t 
o f e M . J L y M _l_a_. uL >t Vi, i. M „ 
I i :i L e f kovr i t v> ^ . J>K \vs-,'\n.-, _ , *• * „C t 8 8 6 , 
43 L . E d . 2d ] 96 C-M7a)„ i h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l o {" Mew \. ; j ,k c o n t e n d e d 
t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t wrr r : . M,, • ; from r n s i i r j n»s c o n s t i t n t t o n a l 
c l a i m s i n a f e d e r a l h a r e u s c o r p u s p r o c e e d i n g a f t e r t h e y u i l c y 
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plea ha d been entered, based oi i 11 le Supreme Coi 11: !:' s dec ision 
i n Brady y. United States , 3 97 u\ c 7 L , '-0 S.-'C . ;^-c3, 
L . Ea. 2d /4 V i ! . i ~ L J7 *± ' : J i i ^:; CJ;1 ' ^ d ^ o i i , 'V) i . > l',-
S.Ct. 1441, 2!) !..i']c!.2d 7(o (]07'0; and Parker \ . . •-{ !, 
Carol ii la, 3' - S. 790, 90 S.Ct, J 458, 25 I ,. Ed. 2d* 785 (1970). 
The Coml s ta ted: \ 
"
The Brady t r i logy announced the 
general rule that a gui l ty plea, inte] -
l igent ly and voluntari ly made, bars 1:1 le 
la te r assert ion of const i tu t ional 
c h a 1 le n g e s t o t: h e pr e t r i a 1 proceed ing s . " 
;. 95 S.C t :. at 889, 43 L.Ed.2d at 201. 
Th.i.i; orxno i.p i a was reaffirmed in To i jju u _ \ « ::-- ado .:sur., -* i.l 
I . ; -, (r., S.Ct. ICO?, 1608, 30 Livi.2^ 235 1-972,, 
where the Court s ta ted : • • .' 
"When a orimi.ia. defendant has 
solemnly admitted j.n upon coiirl that 
he is in fact guil ty of the offense 
with which he is charged, he may not 
thereafter raise independent claims 
rela t ing to the deprivation of his 
const i tu t ional r igh t s t. hat occurred 
prior to the entry oj' » h,> qi l i l ty ple-i,, " 
T^  ilie present ens^, I lie pet i t ioner has :KA cnalienged the 
fact that in.' •.. ' • ,\.ti .. .^ .. , .i i L.junLJy and volnr tnr i lv 
offered and therefore, according to i^ie general rui . . 0-- • • -
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p l e a had been e n t e r e d , bas^d on tin1 Supremo C o u r t 1 ; ; d e c i s i o n 
i n Brady v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 3 9"/ 0 5 7 12, 5 J ^ . C L . 1463 , 25 
I,.:« h . •' : • : ; fKjr-L.mi / . K J c h a r d s o n , 397 U . S . 759, 90 
S . C t , ! ,-'• : , .- > I .Ed .2d 7«,5 ( 1 9 7 J ) ; and j^ai^kc) * _ JJOJ J-ii 
C a r o l i n a , 3 9 / U .u . 790, 00 S . r t . 1 /58 , 753 !,. Ed., 2d* 785 ( 1 9 7 0 ) . 
The Cour t s t a t e d : ' ." '• ' ' 
"The Brady t r i l o g y announced t h e 
g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t a g u i l t y p l e a , i n t e l -
l i g e n t l y and v o l u n t a r i l y made, b a r s t h e 
l a t e r a s s e r t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
• • c h a l l e n g e s t o t h e p r e t r i a l p r o c e e d i n g s . " 
.. - 95 S . C t . a t 8 8 9 , 43 I ...Ed, 2d a t 2 0 1 . 
T h i s p r i n c i p l e was r e a l T i r
 t . ;,. l o •..;.«,. t i v . jk. nderson , 411 
V. • ?*%, ?^7 , 03 ",.r\ , . . . / . It (.08, 'M> E„Ed.2d 235 ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 
wher e t h e Cou i E t. ') -
"When a c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t h a s 
s o l e m n l y a d m i t t e d i n open cot i r t t h a t ' 0 
he i s i n f a c t g u i l t y of t h e o f f e n s e 
w i t h which he i s c h a r g e d , he may not 
t h e r e a f t e r r a i s e i n d e p e n d e n t c l a i m s 
r e l a t i n g t o t ,ic d r p r i v ) i i <>D "4" 1J " 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s t h i t o c c u r r e d 
p r i o r t o t h e ^ n t r v • E" Mw- cm i [ i y ;» | ( \ i . M 
In t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , t h e p e t i t i o n e r hat> not c h a l l e n g e d tOe 
f'^ '-': • .: ' / • - ...• • • ', / t e a was i n t e l l i g e n t l y .md v j l u ^ i a r j iy 
o f f e r e d rind t h e r e f o r e , a c c o r d i n g t o u x g ^ u e r E . =.• .; 
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waived any objections to the proceedings prior to the entry 
m " th .•;, ; i • y i •..*.. -
Other s ta te courts , in cases sin i:i ] a r I:c » 1:\ le p r e s e i 11 
CMS- : , have a l s o u n i f o r m l y h v Id '. h.. : ,J p l e a oil q u i . K \ c o m p e t e n t l y 
and v o l u n t a r i l y e n t e r e d \\ . i : i- : i ^o** a e t - j c a ; , , I n 
Webb v . S t a t e , , o - v . _ '?3.- J ' . J r i l t d (1CJ75) , w h e r e t h e , 
a p p e i j - 'n<^ wn : • i o l :a ^ J L i a g a ] U S P o f a m p h r t a n x i n e s , 
a r g u a u t h a i a d e p u t y a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l c o u l d n o t s i g . 1:1 :ie 
i n f o r u e t i o i i upoi: i w h i c l I t h e a p p e l l a n t e n t e r e d h i s g u i l t y p i c a , 
t h e c o u r t a f f i r m e d t h e c o n v i c t i o n and h e l d t h a i I lie a p p e U a n t 
c o u l d n o t c o m p l a i n o f e v e n t s p r e c e d i n g t h e g u i l t y p . l c n . I n 
• H i l l v . S t a t e , 488 P . ,M '^ >7t (Ok I a . P r i m , o p p . 1P7 ] ) , w h e r e t h e 
p e t i t i o n e r f i l e d a p . •* s e J-CLJ i a o n lo i a .-vx.it o f h a b e a s c o r p u s 
o n trio ai M- 1:- I i\ i :• ,. p r o p e r l y a r r a i g n e d on t h e b u r q l a r y 
c h a r g e or" w inch he u ^ s c o m i e L e d , i n e C o u r t h e l d t h a c .. p ! * - --
g i :. ' • .' -o . i i ' ' . n •. o , .- (•; i iO.M'j J y e n t e r e d w a i v e d a l l p r o ! Lm u;<o'y 
d e f e c t . - , L u o j u d i n g any i m p r o p e r a r i a i g n m e i i t on )• . ; . . * * oi\<, * 
See . i .-.:«•; .Pounds v . W a r d e n / N e v a d a S t a t e P r i s o n , o:e v .
 # 
537 P . 2 d 47a ( 1 9 7 5 ) , a n d S t a t e v . Pers lo .un , ' • . , . . , : o^ -
I Iowa S u p , C t . 1974) . ' . . 
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T h u s , b e c a u s e t h e p e t i t i o n e r £.n. o , . . i . . 1 •; 
o b j c c ' : 1:0 i h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e i u for ma t jc»n p r i o-" • .) 
e n t e r i n g h i s y u i l i v /•-•'- • v. >!< - .- c e r 
c h a l l e n g e t h e s u f f i c i e n c y 01 I he i . i j o r n u i t i o n . 
. CC:l ','^,.c;.SF • 
S i n c e t h e p e t i t i o n e r ' s p r e m i s e i n t h i s a p p e a l i s 
,-- : ' 1-'. a s w e l l a s t h e c l e a r m a j o r i t y o f 
j u r j su icL i o n s # li^s l i t i u Lliat r n a n s l a u c in. ;M :-< ic - : . ; e r 
i n c l v ; !LM o f f e n s e o f s e c o n d deg ree - uutrcJcc, <jnd s i n c e t h e ' 
p e t i t i o n e r f a i l e d I • •' i c - ip • •' 1 • • • ; . ! ' i_.ici.ency o f t h e 
i n f o r m a t i o n p c i o t : U- Live e n t e r i n g o r h i s - j u i l L y p i e u , 
r e s p o n d e n t n r q o s ,m a p t; xnua Irion ol. L ho lower c o u r t ' s o r d e r . 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d , 
VERNON B . ROMNEY 
• A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
EAR], >'., DORIUS 
Assist an c Attorney General 
A i t':";!': • ' • "'!'"' S t ' i, : 
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